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Since the 1990s many new parties have emerged in European party systems. These parties have often been labelled 
as populist, extreme-right or anti-system parties. This paper examines to what extent new parties have indeed 
adopted a different style of competition and contestation within European democracies. If so, does this imply a 
trend towards populism and how do these new parties impact established parties and the extant party system? The 
following questions are examined: Why have new parties successfully emerged? Why do new parties seem to 
emerge more on the ‘right’ than on the ‘left’ of the political spectrum? In addition we discuss their issue profile and 
their role vis-à-vis party system development. Our findings suggest that many new parties can indeed be considered 
as populist and rightwing radical. The issue profile of such parties is different from other (traditional) parties and 
this explains in part their electoral growth. This implies – amongst other things - that new, often populist, parties 
successfully challenge the power resources of the established ‘political class’. 
 






The successful rise of ‘new’ political parties and conversely the relative demise of established parties 
during the nineties is obvious. What causes these changing patterns of electoral allegiance and party 
competition? After the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the political unionisation of Europe, mass publics in the 
West appear to become increasingly more discontent with the political institutions of representative 
democracy and their ‘ruling’ elites (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Coupled with the growing de-alignment of 
existing political loyalties and affiliations (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), representative governance in its 
current institutional format is challenged by new types of parties and entrepreneurial politicians that 
emphasize ‘popular’ democracy instead of ‘representative’ governance (Meny and Surel, 2002). In this 
article we investigate the following questions: 
- What constitutes a ‘new party’ and why are they successful vis-à-vis the established parties and 
elites, particularly, in the nineties? 
- How different are these parties from others and what impact do they have on party system 
development and representative government?  
We will argue that the emergence and success of new parties is not merely coincidental but that their rise 
represents a significant development within European democracies where ‘old’ forms of contestation (and 
elite cooperation) within the political class are gradually transformed and replaced by ‘new’ challengers. 
This development also signals a radicalisation of political competition, which undermines the power base 
of the traditional political parties (Pennings and Keman, 2003). 
 We will examine three dimensions of party system change in relation to the rise of this new type of 
party. First, the vertical dimension will be discussed, which is the relation between the political class and 
the ‘demos’. A shift becomes visible towards populist tendencies with respect to mass political attitudes 
and involvement of the electorate. We argue that new political entrepreneurs mobilize existing groups and 
tap into latent discontent of new groups of ‘outsiders’ and disappointed voters in general. These populist 
‘entrepreneurs’ include not only new parties per se, but also ‘new’ parties that emerged from a former 
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traditional party, either as a result of a split or ‘refoundation’ (see also Mair, 1999; see Table 1). Second, 
we will examine how the rise of new populist challenger parties affects the issue ownership of the 
traditional competitors in European party systems and consequently their competitive strength (Budge and 
Farlie, 1983). Finally, on the horizontal axis – inter-party competition - we assess how these ‘new’ types 
of ideological competition by new parties are affecting the usual patterns of competition at the party 
system level both among the traditional parties as well as between traditional and new parties. 
 
2. Emergence and Success of New Parties 
 
Recently, attention has been paid to the concept and impact of ‘new parties’ in political science (see: 
Müller-Rommel 1998; Hug, 2001; Mair, 2002). Most of their conceptualisations, however, are 
theoretically confusing and empirically misleading. What is confusing is that researchers often take for 
granted that new parties are either (extreme) right-wing or post-materialist (see: Ignazi, 1997; Lane and 
Ersson, 2002). In addition, these studies seem to suggest that parties are ‘new’ simply because they are not 
old. What distinguishes new parties from old parties and what type of party is emerging? Simon Hug 
rightly points out that ‘new’ parties (have been) develop(ing) all the time in all forms and formats but that 
we simply no longer remember most of them (Hug, 2001: 14). One obvious reason is because they had 
very little impact on the party system as a whole. Another reason is that many ‘new’ parties are often the 
result of a merger (e.g. CDA, Green Left and Christian Union in the Netherlands), a change of name (e.g. 
the SenterPartiet in Sweden, the SVP in Switzerland and the Allianza Nazionale in Italy), a fission within 
the old party (e.g. the Liberales Forum in Austria and the Democratic Left in Ireland) or of a development 
of two party systems in one polity (as can be seen in Belgium due to federalisation of Belgium). In some 
cases it concerns the refoundation of a party (like the FPÖ in Austria and a part of the Communist Party in 
Italy; Mair, 1999). 
In other words: the definition of what constitutes a ‘new party’ varies considerably among students 
of parties (see: Mair, 2002; Hug, 2001: Ch. 5; Deschouwer, 2004: 3-4). Mair, for instance, defines new 
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parties as those that first began to contest elections after 1960 (including those parties emerging from a 
merger or split), which leads to the conclusion that more than 176 new parties emerged across Europe 
(Mair, 2002: Table 6.4). Conversely, Hug adopts a more restricted definition and includes only ‘genuine’ 
new parties that emerge without any help of members of existing parties and fissions. Fusions of two or 
more existing parties and electoral alliances are not considered new since this type concerns merely a 
reorganisation of established political parties (Hug, 2001: 13). This conceptualisation tends to exclude 
those parties that are perhaps not ‘genuinely new’ but that nevertheless have transformed themselves 
radically and can no longer be considered to belong to their original party families. For instance, should 
parties that have recently undergone significant changes in leadership, thus transforming the cores of these 
parties, also be considered new parties? Our answer is that if and when such a party has clearly moved out 
of the bounds of its original party family then it is considered to be a ‘new party’ (Mair and Mudde, 1998). 
In other words, what is crucial is that these parties emphasize other issues than are principally ‘owned’ by 
the original party.  
 Thus, in view of these considerations we propose to define a ‘new party’ as: those organisations 
that autonomously recruit candidates for public office, based on ideas that do not correspond with 
existing-cum-established party families during two subsequent elections (see for an overview of these 
indicators: Siaroff, 2000; Gallagher et al., 2005: 229ff). In addition we propose that in empirical terms a 
new party ought to have participated in two successive elections after 1975 and gained parliamentary 
representation. This period is chosen because we argue that since the mid-seventies the de-freezing of 
party systems (i.e. the Lipset/Rokkan hypothesis; see: Bartolini and Mair, 1990) began to emerge. Below 
in Table 1 we have listed the new parties that have emerged since 1975 in Europe and we have also 
indicated whether they are ‘new’, ‘re-born’, the result of a fusion (marriage) or fission (divorce), to what 
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In all of the 13 European democracies, new political parties have emerged. In total, it concerns 44 cases of 
which 23 can be considered as ‘brand new’, 9 parties are ‘re-born’, 8 are fissions (divorced), 4 are fusions 
(marriage), and 6 of the new parties do not exist any more (labelled ‘dead’). The most susceptible party 
systems to renewal are found in Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands (5 or more), followed by France, 
Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Ireland and Finland (3 or more). Party systems in Scandinavia and in the 
United Kingdom seem less prone to the emergence of new political competitors. Table 1 also indicates 
that particularly the consensus democracies of mainland Europe seem to allow for the formation of new 
parties. This may well be a consequence of the demise of depoliticised party behaviour and cleavage led 
loyalties that characterised many of these political systems after the Second World War.  
Two party families are dominant among the new political parties: the environmental or ‘green’ 
party family and the ‘new’ (often radical) right. With the exception of Norway and the UK, green parties 
entered all European party systems during the eighties and nineties. In most countries these are newly 
formed parties, only in Denmark and the Netherlands did the green movement merge into a broader left-
wing alliance (Müller-Rommel, 1998; Mair, 2002). The new parties of the radical right are far too 
heterogeneous to deserve the label ‘party family’. They should rather be seen as an extended family with 
re-founded and radically transformed liberal or conservative parties (for example: FPÖ and SVP), semi-
fascist parties (like the Italian AN and the German Republikaner), regionalist radical parties (Lega Nord, 
Vlaams Blok/Belang) and ‘genuinely’ new parties (Progress Party, List Pim Fortuyn, New Democrats). 
In terms of electoral support for these new parties, the figures show that they achieved an average 
of 22.6 per cent of the total vote in 2003: twice as much as they gained in the 1980s. In particular in Italy, 
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland have new parties that have accrued substantial 
electoral support. Growth in new party support is clearly a continental European affair, hardly affecting 
the UK and to a lesser extent Sweden and Ireland. The most salient finding of Table 1, is that the support 
for Green parties rose from 2.8 percent in the 1990s on average to 4.9 percent in the following decade, 
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while the radical right vote increased from 4.3 to 10 percent over the same period. Overall, new parties 
now attract more than twenty percent of the votes in Europe, half of which is mobilized by the new parties 
of the radical right. All in all, we have concluded that there has been a doubling of ‘new’ parties since the 
1990s for which 1 out of 5 voters choose at present. Further, the ‘new’ Right appears to be the most 
successful challenger among these parties. These developments are particularly noticeable in consensus 
democracies. Then what are the factors that can make us understand this development? 
  
3. Understanding the rise of new political parties 
 
Various explanations have been suggested to account for the decline in votes for the established party 
families and, subsequently, the rise of the new parties. A paradoxical development can be discerned: 
While – viewed from a long-term perspective – the established party families in most European countries 
remain more or less stable, overall levels of electoral turnout show a downward trend and electoral 
volatility increases rapidly in the 1990s. In this section we discuss the changing attitudes of citizens 
towards the political system, the steady decline in voters’ turn out, and the rise in electoral volatility. We 
will examine to what extent these factors help to understand the shifting support for ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
parties. 
 
3.1 System disassociation of citizens 
 
The development of many of the new parties we identified indicates, inter alia, increasing signs of a new 
‘anti-politics’ culture emerging within the established western democracies. In the post Cold War era 
representative democracy is considered almost self evident and – due in large part to Europeanization – 
decision-making appears to be merely a technocratic regime rather than a political activity on the basis of 
partisan or ideological motivation. In other words, the gap between the electorate and politics seems to 
widen. Hence, the so-called ‘political class’, whose members are coming from the (larger) established 
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party families appear to be detached from the ‘normal’ life of citizens (Dalton, 2002; Inglehart, 1997). 
Two ‘exit’ routes seem to be available for dissatisfied voters: displacement and de-alignment. It seems 
likely that these options are not only practised, but they may also explain the successful emergence of new 
political competitors and ‘challenger parties’ in all European party systems (see Mair, 2005: 8-9; Gunther 
et al., 2002: 4-5).  
 
De-alignment and displacement are closely linked processes: Traditional political parties find it 
increasingly difficult to appeal to overarching or shared identities and loyalties of specific social groups. 
Despite the fact that the traditional parties have transformed their party organisation substantially and have 
shown a high capability to adapt to changing environments (Katz and Mair 2002; Krouwel 2006), 
established parties now seem less capable than hitherto in maintaining strong links with voters. This is 
amply illustrated in the literature on citizens, parties and party system development (see: Franklin, 2003; 
Dalton, 2002). Dalton and others, for instance, show that levels of electoral participation are in part an 
effect of displacement. In addition, they demonstrate clearly that the core vote for traditional parties is 
declining everywhere in Europe (Dalton et al., 2003: 29; see also Table 2 below). Also, established 
supporter groups have become more diffuse and they have fewer institutional links with party-political 
organisations, which leads to less loyal voting behaviour. New voter groups (younger generations, de-
industrialized labour and immigrants) enter the electorate with even less party-political socialisation and 
encapsulation (Kitschelt, 1997; Dalton, 2002). Moreover, the traditional channels of communication, party 
organisations, ancillary organisations and the party press, have almost completely disappeared in all 
European countries. 
In sum, the successful emergence of new (in particular radical right) parties may be due to two 
types of displacement: one, retreat from ‘politics’ altogether; or two, using the vote to support ‘anti-
establishment’ parties and a ‘new’ type of leadership that challenges the extant political class. The effect 
of the second type of displacement can be considered as a form of ‘replacement’ of groups of voters (see 
e.g. the rise of Berlusconi: McCarthy, 1996). Here displacement is transformed into de-alignment, which 
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subsequently results in electoral shifts. What emerges is a more generalised growth of distrust in, and 
indifference to, traditional politics, political organisations and traditional leadership (see for example 
Hayward 1996; Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Katz and Mair , 2002). In other words: 
dissatisfaction with party politics across Europe is apparent everywhere and seems to result in lower rates 
of electoral participation, on the one hand, and in electoral replacement, on the other hand. We argue that 
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3.2 Receding electoral turnout and rising electoral volatility 
 
One indicator both for the failure of the traditional parties and for the electoral success 
of new parties across the ‘new’ Europe since the 1990s are the rise in electoral 
volatility and the steady decline in turnout, particularly in the 1990s (Mair, 2002). 
While turnout at national elections remained relatively high and stable until the 1980s, 
in recent decades a steady decline in voter participation is discernable (minus 13,4 % 
for all countries since the sixties). From Table 2 we also read that this decline in 
political participation in all European democracies continued to drop between 1980 
and present (-11 %). Particularly citizens in Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland are 
apparently opting out of the political process. Sharp declines can also be seen in 
Austria, Germany, and to a lesser extent in Italy and France. Even in countries where 
turnout was always lower, such as Switzerland and the UK, electoral participation 
continued to decline. Only in Belgium (as a result of compulsory voting) and 
Denmark (but is a volatile rate) is the drop in turnout less dramatic. However, the 
overall trend is clearly down in all European countries and has resulted in the lowest 
level of electoral participation in the post-war period (see also Mair, 2002: 129). More 
than 30 per cent of the European electorate now choose to stay away from elections 
and has apparently displaced electoral party politics altogether. 
 As Table 2 also shows, the replacement rate – indicated by the level of 
electoral volatility - is almost inversely related to electoral turnout. In other words: 
both ‘displacement’ and ‘replacement’ occur simultaneously in the 1990s. An 
increasing number of citizens choose not to show their face in a polling station, and 
those that do show up seem to have a growing propensity to switch parties from 
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election to election. Although Gallagher et al. (2005: 290-296) argued that stability 
across Europe is still prevalent, we beg to differ. First of all, this is because 
individualisation as expressed in social orientations is changing as well as a decline in 
religiosity and – for instance – class voting (Nieuwbeerta, 1995: 53). This points to 
the weakening of the party-voter linkage in terms of loyalty and identification. 
Second, Gallagher et al’s argument is based on the aggregated levels of votes for the 
party families of respectively the Left and the Right. Electoral volatility would occur 
mainly within these ‘blocs’. However, recalculating these results by taking out the 
‘New Left’ and the ‘New Right’, it becomes clear that, between 1960 and 2004, the 
traditional parties lose 13.8 per cent of their vote share. Conversely the increase of the 
vote share of ‘new parties’ in the same period is 22.6 per cent (Cf. Gallagher et al., 
2005: 292).  
In sum: Both the movements in electoral turnout and volatility – in particular 
since the 1990s - appear to indicate that political dissatisfaction with traditional 
parties and electoral change are growing together with the success for new parties in 
general and the ‘New (radical) Right’ in particular. This conclusion is in part shared 
by Mair (2002: 132-33) and by Pedersen (1983) when they wrote that the larger 
European countries still show higher levels of turnout and are less volatile than the 
smaller democracies of Europe. In the last decade of the twentieth century, however, 
the growth of electoral volatility has not only accelerated but also widened to the 
larger democracies as well (see Table 2). We therefore have to conclude that the 
gradual decline in turnout and party loyalty indicates a disconnection of a substantial 
part of the electorate from traditional party politics and a growing dissatisfaction with 
the established political leadership. This general decline in attachment to the political 
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system explains in large part why new parties can be more successful than ever 
before. 
 
3.3 Electoral support for new political parties 
 
While links between citizens and traditional political organisations are weakening, 
voters are also shifting their political preferences and seem to be adrift as well. Given 
the high levels of electoral volatility new parties will benefit from this. Below in 
Table 3 we have reported the bi-variate relations between the electoral developments 
of respectively the new parties (as given in Table 2), on the one hand, and the main 
parties across Europe: social democracy and Christian democracy – the leading 
parties in most countries as regards to the left and the right (see also: Keman and 
Pennings, 2004; Gallagher et al., 2005). As Table 2 has shown, more than twenty 
percent of European electorates vote for new political parties and this rise is clearly 
related to electoral volatility. While the relationship with electoral turnout is weaker, 
there nevertheless seems to be a connection. In addition, although the participation 
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Table 3 again demonstrates that the rise of new parties, particular those of the 
(radical) right, are highly and significantly associated with the decline of the vote 
shares for the established parties of both left- and centre-right. Hence, the message is 
loud and clear: the more volatile the electorate, the stronger the rise of new parties. In 
particular, social democratic parties are hurt by all types of new parties, whereas the 
Christian Democrats suffer most from the challenges of the ‘New Right’ (and to some 
degree from the ‘other’ new parties). New Left parties have a lesser impact and seem 
to remain within the leftwing party family (see also: Gallagher et al., 2005). Clearly, 
the electoral decline of both main party families is associated with the rise of the New 
Right, which suggests that these parties compete successfully on a different issue 
dimension than the traditional parties. Both Christian democratic and social 
democratic parties have been haemorrhaging popular support since the 1970s when 
new parties emerged. Christian democratic parties have lost a considerable share of 
their popular support since the 1950s when they polled around twenty per cent of the 
vote across Europe. Since the 1960s this level declined and Christian democratic 
electoral support in Western Europe is now around or even below the sixteen per cent 
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level. Parties of social-democratic origin also lost electoral support, from a steadfast 
average of over thirty percent between the 1950s and the 1970s to around twenty-
eight percent in the 1980s and 1990s (Krouwel 1999). In sum, voters are moving 
away from the traditional party alternatives at an increasing pace and if they do not 
leave the electorate altogether they are inclined to support new political challengers. 
Why then are voters moving away from the traditional party families and why are the 
(radical) right parties in particular so successful in attracting these voters? 
 
4. Polarization and convergence in European party systems 
 
One possible answer is that new parties have more room for electoral competition 
because since the 1990s traditional parties have tended to move closer to one another 
in terms of Left versus Right differences (Klingemann and Volkens, 2002; Keman 
and Pennings, 2004). This would imply a convergence towards the centre of ‘gravity’ 
of these parties in the respective party systems. Below we will examine to what extent 
this appears to be the case and – if so – whether or not this is related to the successful 
emergence of new parties.  
 
4.1 Disappearing party differences and the room for ’new’ competitors 
 
Firstly, we examine the changes in the range of party competition, which is the 
distance between the extreme positions within a party system. To this end we have 
calculated two dimensions of inter-party competition: one, the traditional Left-Right 
dimension and, two: the Progressive-Conservative dimension of competition (see 
Appendix for details). We argue that new forms of electoral competition cannot be 
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sufficiently captured by means of a one-dimensional analysis. New issues and 
attitudes have developed that appear to be related to other ideas than the socio-
economic Left/Right distinction (see also: Laver and Hunt, 1992; Marks and 
Steenbergen, 2004).  
 From our calculations of the 13 party systems (N. of parties: 277) it becomes 
clear that the Left versus Right dimension – although less contested than it used to be 
- is still relevant for party system dynamics. What can be observed is a minor 
convergent tendency occurring on the Left-Right dimension (0.3, indicating little 
change). In addition, we find that average contestation over Progressive versus 
Conservative stances is growing since the eighties (9.7). However, it should be noted 
that variation across Europe is large and patterns of competition are quite different 
within the various party systems under review. For example, at the level of individual 
party systems, it appears that in six countries the traditional parties are moving closer 
to one another in terms of Left versus Right: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland and Sweden. In six other countries parties have actually polarized their 
position on the Left-Right range of party competition: in Austria, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and Great Britain. On the Progressive-
Conservative dimension most party systems show indeed a tendency towards 
polarization. Eight countries polarise on the Progressive-Conservative dimension: 
Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Great Britain. 
It is only in Germany and Ireland that there is little programmatic change on this 
dimension, while parties in Belgium and Switzerland seem to come closer together on 
this conflict dimension. These findings are noteworthy for two reasons: one, it shows 
that party competition is indeed more complex than the simple Left versus Right type 
of contestation as such reveals; two, the results also demonstrate that understanding 
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the success of new parties depends on how and what types of issues dominate inter-
party rivalry within the different European party systems as such. To make more 
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This cross-tabulation first of all demonstrates that polarisation, particularly on the 
Left-Right dimension, is only moderately associated with the electoral success of new 
parties. Countries with high levels of electoral support for new parties tend to cluster 
in the cell that indicates polarisation. Second, however, we clearly discern that 
polarisation per se cannot account for all the cross-system variations in Europe. For 
instance, in Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway new parties do emerge in a 
polarising political climate, yet in Belgium, France and Switzerland new parties 
obviously emerge in a situation of ideological convergence.  
Thus, what is most interesting is that collusion or conflict at the party system 
level is not a necessary condition for the emergence and success of new parties. This 
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goes against the dominant idea in much of the literature (see for example: Kitschelt’s 
Level III hypothesis, Kitschelt, 1997: 141-43; Betz, 2002: 205ff; Norris, 2005: 192ff, 
Abedi 2002). Rather it appears that party system level strife is a possible source for 
the success of new parties, but not the driving force behind it. Table 4 actually 
suggests two trajectories for new parties to emerge successfully: the opportunity 
structure for new parties seems to be enhanced where polarisation is decreasing, and 
conversely a similar opportunity structure is created where polarization grows. It 
seems that party competition is a Janus-faced phenomenon, which is all too often 
neglected: where there are strongly contested views the ‘centre of gravity’ may 
become vacated and other parties have room for filling the empty space. Conversely, 
where parties tend to move to this ‘centre’ there is probably more space and more 
voters left to gain at the rims of the party system space (see: Pennings and Keman, 
2003; Ignazi, 1997: 316-8). In order to examine more closely the ‘crowding of the 
centre-space’ in European party systems, Table 5 provides data on the convergence of 
parties towards the median of the political spectrum (point zero) on both dimensions 
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These results show that, again contrary to what is commonly assumed, in most party 
systems parties are moving away from the centre on either one or both of the 
dimensions. The overall trend is one of centrifugal movement and not of increasing 
centripetal competition. Only in Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland and 
Ireland a centripetal movement of political parties on both dimensions can be 
observed. Clearly there is little evidence of a secular and linear development towards 
more contracted ranges of party competition across Europe in the last two decades. 
The more common centrifugal tendency was most extensive in Austria, Norway, 
Denmark, Italy and Great Britain and to a lesser extent in France, Germany and 
Sweden. On the Progressive-Conservative dimension there is more centripetal 
movement. In Austria, France, Norway and Britain we even see a centrifugal 
movement of parties on both dimension, while these systems have been far from 
immune to the emergence of new parties (with the exception of the UK). These 
centrifugal and centripetal developments of Table 5 enhance the pattern that was 
already visible in Table 4. The data suggests that both convergence and divergence 
appear to contribute to the emergence and success of new parties. Party systems 
where parties diverge at least on the Left-Right dimension also show substantial 
propensity to new party origin and support. Hence, contrary to what is often argued, 
our data-analysis shows that new parties emerge under varying conditions of party 
competition across Europe. New parties emerge in countries where polarization and 
divergence of party competition can be observed: Austria and Norway (polarization 
and simultaneous divergence on both dimensions), while systems with polarization 
and simultaneous divergence on either dimension of contestation have also seen the 
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rise of new parties as can be seen in France, Italy, the Netherlands and to a lesser 
degree in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. 
To sum up: Tables 4 and 5 inform us that there are indeed two roads that bring 
about new parties: either they emerge where there is increasing party contestation on 
either or both dimensions of party competition, while new party support is also 
growing when most of the (established) parties de-polarise and converge towards the 
centre. This can be demonstrated if we calculate the differences between the average 
score of Left versus Right and Progressive versus Conservative positions for the party 
systems as a whole and for new parties in toto: Left versus Right is only 1.54 and for 
Progressive versus Conservative it is 6.78. This means that the party differences are 
not that large. However, if we recalculate this for the (radical) rightwing parties the 
differences are dramatic: Left versus Right = 17.94 and Progressive versus 
Conservative = 12.49. Hence, the party competition for office is fought out on various 
grounds and issues. But – given the fact that rightwing parties are more successful 
electorally than other new parties (see: Table 1) – it also implies that (radical) 
rightwing parties appear to be particularly capable to make inroads under centripetal 
as well as under centrifugal conditions. This paradox may well be related with another 
factor that is more and more discussed, but is hardly examined in more detail: the 
emergence of new types political entrepreneurial behaviour. This behaviour is 
associated – as the literature suggests – with ‘populism’ that presents itself inter alia 
by ‘new’ issues (Betz, 2002; Taggart, 2000; Meny and Surel, 2002). 
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5. New parties, new issues, new right? 
 
The emergence of new parties should therefore not simply be considered as a one-way 
causal argument on the basis of party systems’ dynamics alone. On the contrary: in 
addition to this variable, so we argue, the capacity of new parties to successfully 
appeal to the electorate is particularly due to the development of a fundamentally 
different set of issues and issue priorities that lie outside the confines of the Left 
versus Right and Progressive versus Conservative dimensions (or are at least not 
considered as central issues for traditional party families). As we reported already, in 
all party systems, but particularly in Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Switzerland and Finland the new (radical) rightwing parties depart substantially from 
the party system mean (the relative centre of party competition) and are also more 
radical in terms of distance from other new parties. 
Despite the fact that the new radical right parties position themselves far from 
the political centre of party competition, they should not be labelled by definition as 
‘extreme-right’ political parties. We will argue that the new radical right must be 
labelled populist right if and when its profile in issue priorities is not only distinctive 
but also substantively different. Below we will show that the issue priorities of new 
radical right parties consist of a coherent set of issues that fit quite well with existing 
ideas on what a populist ideological profile is. Moreover, this set of issue-priorities is 




5.1 Populist ideology and issues 
 
In the literature three core elements of a populist ideology are dominant: (a) the notion 
of a unified sovereign people whose will can be expressed by – preferably - the 
actions of one political leader, (b) an aversion against political intermediaries such as 
political parties and affiliated interest organisations, (c) less institutional and 
bureaucratic procedures that stand in the way of the direct expression of the people’s 
will (Canovan, 1999; 2002; Taggart, 2000; Meny and Surel, 2002; Mudde, 2004). 
First and foremost populism is characterised by the idea that political 
decisions are made under direct forms of popular control, and that the sovereignty of 
the people is the point of departure of all political action (vertical democracy). Central 
to populism is thus the notion of a singular, united and organic people, which is pitted 
against those ruling in their name. Populists construct two counter positions: one, 
between the people and the ’political class’, and two, between ‘the political elite’ and 
the populist leader himself (Schedler 1996). Clearly the populist leader sides with the 
people on this divide. As Mudde (2004: 543) puts it: populism is ’an ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups, the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’. In the eyes of the populist, the 
established elites have hijacked representative democracy, and the populist leader will 
bring it back to the people. In addition, in the view of populists differences between 
opposition and government are meaningless. Populists ‘recode the universe of 
political actors as a homogeneous political class’ (Schedler 1996: 295). For populists, 
the entire political establishment, whether in government or not, is recruited through 
the same corrupt institutional mechanisms and they all take part in a dishonest system 
that betrays the will of the people. In this logic representative democracy is perceived 
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as a malfunctioning system because the ruling class is corrupt, unrepresentative, 
unresponsive and incompetent (if not ‘undemocratic’). The leaders of the major 
traditional parties are not perceived as ‘contenders’, but as ‘adversaries’ (Schedler 
1996: 300; Mair, 2005).  
Next to the ruling elite, populists also agitate against intermediary political 
organisations (such as political parties) that stand in the way of the true, direct and 
unbiased expression of the will of the people: ‘that politics should be an expression of 
the volonté général (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004: 543). In the same way 
all political intermediary organisations such as political parties, trade unions and 
interest organisations, the bureaucracy, the press and the ‘intelligentsia’ are seen to 
obstruct the will of the people, populist disapproval of representative democracy is a 
reaction against elitist democracy and its institutional framework like the bureaucratic 
state (Mair, 2005). In the populist’s view, representatives do not represent the people 
but only themselves. Representative or indirect democracy is attacked in the name of 
democracy as an ideal. Populism is then, in the words of Kitschelt (2002: 179), ‘an 
expression of dissatisfaction with existing modes of organisation of elite-mass 
political intermediation’. The populist critique on representative democracy 
particularly focuses on political parties that are seen as divisive and on the 
bureaucratic and institutional structures that they create in order to complicate and 
obscure policy-making. Populists will propagate more direct forms of democracy, 
such as referenda, popular consultations and direct election of office-holders.  
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5.2 Analysing populist tendencies among established and new parties 
 
On the basis of these core elements of populism we have selected four issue areas that 
are derived from the Manifesto-Date Project (see: Budge et al., 2001) and will be used 
as proxy indicators of a populist stance of political parties. These are: anti-
bureaucracy (denouncing political efficacy and lack of control by the regulatory 
state), anti-EU (which refers to the idea of a ‘heartland’ and can serve as a proxy for 
anti-elite sentiments in Western Europe), pro-authority (a proxy for strong leadership, 
more direct rule and anti-intermediary practices) and, lastly, xenophobia (an ethnic 
version of a unified and ‘pure people’). Arguably, these indicators allow for a 
systematic and comparative comparison of populist tendencies across political parties. 
In particular this allows us to investigate whether or not new right wing parties are 
indeed ‘populist’ as well. Table 6 below provides the information of the electoral 
platforms of established’, newly found and new radical right-wing parties devoted to 
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Table 6 shows that sentiments regarding ‘big government’, the bureaucratic moloch, 
have been a salient concern for all parties for the whole period. This concern is also 
evident in ideas on the efficient and effective ‘state’. However, the anti-EU sentiments 
and the ‘environment’ are clearly issues that beget saliency in the 1990s. Yet, what is 
more obvious than everything else is that radical right wing parties clearly have a 
different and more pronounced issue profile from other – old and new - parties. 
Radical right wing parties are far more anti-bureaucratic and pro-authority than other 
parties. Apart from the ecological issue – which they obviously do not ‘own’ – the 
new right outscore all other parties on the issues that we consider not only rightwing 
but also a central part of populist rhetoric. In particular the xenophobic sentiment is 
markedly more salient than with all other parties. Obviously, traditional parties did 
not put too much emphasis on anti-bureaucratic and pro-authority issues until the 
1990s. In fact, during the 1980s new parties used to be not so different from the 
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traditional parties, but the emergence of the radical right parties has dramatically 
transformed the political competition into a more populist direction. Hence, our 
examination clearly demonstrates that the established parties are attacked from two 
sides: the Green/Left and the Radical Right. These new parties have forced the other 
parties to compete on issues that were traditionally less salient. 
 Recall that we have concluded in the foregoing section that apparently party 
competition follows two trajectories: on the one hand, the emergence of new parties 
can well be the result of centrifugal tendencies, on the other hand, it also seems to be 
related to centripetal developments. In fact, when we relate the information in Table 6 
to Tables 4 and 5 we can see that different circumstances appear to be conducive to 
similar effects, namely that under widely varying circumstances rightwing parties are 
able to mobilise the electorate by means of populist tactics. For example the Belgium 
Vlaams Blok (now renamed Vlaams Belang), the Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale 
in Italy, Blocher’s SVP in Switzerland and the Dutch LPF are staunch anti-
bureaucratic parties and ‘heartland’ oriented in their speech (Kitschelt, 2002). This 
type of issue framing is even starker when we look at emphasis on the need for more 
political authority. Radical right wing parties place a stronger emphasis on strong 
leadership and authority than other parties in their party systems. Especially the FPÖ 
in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Italian radical right (LN and AN) and the 
Dutch LPF emphasize the need for more authoritative political action. We also note 
that the issue of the multicultural society (xenophobia) is relevant but is less 
pronounced than the other types of contestation. Yet, the emphasis on xenophobia, if 
and when it occurs, is almost exclusively the domain of the radical right parties (3.8 
versus 1.2 on average; see Table 6).  
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These important findings not only highlight the fact that radical right parties 
often have a high populist issue profile and thus differ substantially from other 
established and new parties, but it also makes clear why party system change per se is 
insufficient for explaining the emergence and success of these parties. They compete 
on different ‘terms’, whereby divergence or convergence of the party system appears 
as a significant but collateral factor. It is therefore crucial to investigate how and in 
what way the issue profiles of old and new parties are contingent upon each other. In 
other words: do specific types of contestation exist and are these types indicative for 
the emergence of different types of new parties or not? 
 
5.3  Different styles of competition: actions & reactions 
Table 6 showed that two salient issue profiles emerged during the nineties: a ‘new 
right populist’ and a ‘new green-left’ profile, both leading to electoral success for a 
substantial number of new parties. Of course, the established parties have followed 
suit by emphasizing a number of these issues as well, but merely sotto voce. In order 
to highlight this process of interaction between traditional and new parties, and within 
the new parties between the radical right and ecological parties, we examine below in 
Table 7 to what extent the various populist and the ecological issues are related to one 
another at the level of European political parties. In addition, we inspect in what way 
these patterned relationships are associated with our measures of party competition at 
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The table shows that several core populist issues (anti-bureaucratic, anti-EU and 
xenophobic emphases) are highly and significantly interrelated. Most parties, old and 
new, put less coherent emphasis on typical right-wing populist issues, compared to the 
radical right. Particularly striking is that a rightwing radical party’s emphasis on 
xenophobia is interdependent with anti-EU emphasis, on the one hand, and is related 
to anti-bureaucratic attitudes, on the other hand. To reiterate, new radical right wing 
parties emphasize much more strongly and more coherent ‘populist’ issues. In 
addition, the signs are often in the opposite direction, indicating that the Radical Right 
has a distinct profile, with the possible exception of EU-attitudes and environmental 
issues. Most parties are concerned about the environment, reluctant about strong 
statism and against negative ideas on foreigners and immigration policy, yet the less 
rightwing and conservative a party is across western Europe the more they appear to 
differ from the ‘new right’. In this respect there is little distance between traditional 
parties and most of the new parties that are either left socialist, progressive libertarian 
or green parties (see: Table 1). Yet the odd-one-out seems to be the Radical Right, 
which shows a distinct issue profile.  
We argue that the emergence and electoral success of new parties ought to be 
understood as a dual development: On the one hand, new parties as such are more 
successful than before due to general factors like dissatisfaction of many citizens with 
the established parties and voters are more willing than before to switch from one to 
another party. Recall that the correlations between electoral volatility and the vote 
share of new parties is 0.82 (and for New Right Parties 0.77). On the other hand, these 
general features, which manifested themselves during the 1990s, can be considered as 
conditions under which radical right ideas, transmitted in a populist fashion, appear to 
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explain the dramatic rise of new radical rightwing parties (particularly in Austria, 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and recently in Norway and Switzerland). Taken 
together this might be an answer to the puzzle when, where and how new parties 
emerge: there is not a linear relationship here, but rather a conditional framework, a 
‘window of opportunity’ that however must be opened at the right time by the ‘right’ 
persons with the ‘right’ message. Exactly this line of argument becomes visible in the 
issue profile of those new rightwing parties that have been successful. As Table 7 
shows their message is quite distinct from other parties – be it old or new. This may 
well imply that the combination of two bundles of issues emerging in European party 
systems boost the competitive power of new parties: the viewing of the world 
‘outside’ the own country (or: outside the ‘heartland’) and the dissatisfaction with the 
‘inside’ performance of the democratic political system (the ‘failing’ state) (Gabel and 
Anderson, 2004). And precisely these two bundles are difficult to contest for the 
established parties as well as for the other, often more progressive new parties. ‘Old’ 
parties have an undeniable responsibility as parties of government in the eye of many 
of the voters, whereas the ‘Green & Left’ new parties appear often as pro-statist, 
internationalist and can be considered as ‘rebels’ with their own agenda that concurs 
less with the population at large, or with the individual (non-)voter compared to the 
more ‘popular’ radical right issue profile (Dalton, 2002).  
If our observations based on these bi-variate relations are correct, then it 
appears that not only the ‘window of opportunities’ are more open and better used 
than before, but also that the modes of interaction within party systems are shifting. 
We argue that, instead of competing on the basis of contesting issues between parties, 
the struggle for the voter is increasingly focussed on the domains of identification 
such as the concept of belonging to a ‘heartland’, which seems to relate to nationalist 
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and anti-EU attitudes (Sani and Sartori, 1983). This would signify that longstanding 
issues are less central to party competition – the well-known battle ground for the 
established parties and their elites – but rather a new field is developing: appealing to 
sentiments and identities of (parts of) the electorate rather than making pledges on 
policy related issues regarding the public welfare at large (Hooghe et al., 2004). This 
point, we are inclined to argue, is ignored in much electoral and party system 
research. Societal developments have not only dramatically changed since the early 
1990s, but have apparently impacted seriously on the life of individual voters (Van 
der Eijk and Marklin, 2004), particularly as citizens are far less encapsulated in a 
fixed socio-political environment and are less politically socialized (see: Dalton and 
Wattenberg, 2000; Kitschelt, 2002). This signifies a new trend in electoral politics and 





Across Europe, a substantial number of new parties have successfully emerged due to 
the resignation of twenty percent of the voters to support traditional political parties 
(after discounting the lower turnout of voters). In particular, the radical right has been 
able to develop a niche of its own by means of stressing populist issues. Conversely, 
the established parties and the related ‘political class’ appear unable to counter this 
new mode and strategy of party competition. 
We demonstrated that in many European polities the radical populist right is 
obviously making inroads into the electoral basis of the traditional parties. It became 
clear that the rise of the radical populist right is only weakly related to the general 
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pattern of competition on the main conflict dimensions along which traditional parties 
compete. Therefore, new radical right parties emerge in situations of collusion and 
convergence, as well as in periods of polarisation and divergence within party 
systems. We have shown that the new radical right was able to do this because they 
compete by means of a distinct and coherent issue profile that can be labelled populist 
and is indeed very ‘popular’ among vast groups of voters.  
That radical right parties have been successful at the polling stations may well 
have the result of their exclusion by the traditional parties. This strategy of collusion 
and cartelisation of traditional parties may hold back the populist forces for some 
years, but the empirical evidence shows that the populist appeal will only increase 
because exclusion by the major political actors only feeds into their populist strategy. 
For instance, the fact that major parties in consensus democracies have been most 
inclined to respond with cartelisation even more than before in reaction to electoral 
rise of populist parties, may well account for the success of new parties in these cases. 
Cartelisation of the traditional parties and blatant exclusion of new parties with 
substantial electoral support only feeds the discontent and dissatisfaction that seems to 
characterise modern electorates (Mair, 2005). In consensus democracies, where 
economic and social change such as de-industrialisation, individualisation and 
retrenchment of the welfare state have eroded many social and economic securities of 
citizens, the masses have began to drift into a radical right and populist direction 
(Dalton and Gray, 2003). If traditional elites want to survive politically, they need to 
reconsider their political strategies and restore the crucial link between voters, parties 
and democratic governance. When the elites only respond with a further retreat into 
the bastions of the state, Italy may not be the last collapse of an established political 
system. Hence, the ‘political class’ would be wise to reflect more on its own 
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democratic performance and seek ways to re-establish its links with large parts of the 
electorate (the ‘demos’). Instead of only defending its power position vis-à-vis ‘new’ 
parties, established parties need urgently to develop new ideas on how to govern for 
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Development of Left versus Right and Progressive versus Conservative scales 
 
Data sources: 
Both scales used in this paper have originally been published in Keman and Pennings, 2004. 
They are based on the Manifesto Research Group data set as published by Budge et al., 2001 
(see for details pp. 219-28). The countries included are listed in Table 1. The period covered 
is 1975-1998.Parties are the unit of analysis (N = 277), party systems are aggregates of parties 
by country.  
 
Scale construction: 
The Left vs. Right and Progressive vs. Conservative dimensions are developed in an 
interactive way. We have used the original Right-Left scale developed by Budge et al. (see: 
228) but confined a priori the items for LvsR to socio-economic topics mainly. By means of 
factor analysis using Principal Axis Factoring (PAF: Eigen Values > .75) we arrived at 5 
positive and five negative categories for each scale (cumulative explained variance for LvsR = 
75,7% and for PvsC = 75,2%) that are meaningfully loaded. The bi-variate relationship 
between the factor scores of the two scales is, r = -.607**. 
 
Scale computation: 
The items derived by this procedure have been used to compute the LvsR and PvsC scores for 
each party as follows: The scale LvsR by computing Left issues minus Right issues. Likewise, 
the scale PvsC is computed as: Progressive minus Conservative issues. The theoretical 
maximum value of the scale is +100 (all proportional emphases on the Left or Progressive 
issues by party). The minimum value is –100 (all proportional emphases on the Right or 
Conservative issues by party).  
 
Overview of the items included in the dimensions of LvsR and PvsC scales 
Left issues  Right issues Progressive issues Conservative issues 
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